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inequalities, regional inequalities, as well as inequalities between artistic genres. The gifts have  
predominantly gone to already successful projects, sometimes even already profitable 
projects. On the flipside the gifts have primarily come from large, mostly partially state-owned 
enterprises, and acted as the equivalent of a tax-cut for these organizations. From the 
evidence it is not clear that any particular market failure is alleviated through the Rouanet 
Law, instead it seems that the system of indirect support leads to a strong control over the 
cultural sector by big business in Brazil. We use these findings to criticize much of the 
literature on cultural policy which tends to take Western well-developed institutions for 
granted. We argue that this literature is ill-suited to capture the economy of Brazil and other 
‘limited-access states’, because of its implicit assumption of a pre-existing ‘open-access state’.   
 
Introduction 
An extensive literature in the field of economics of arts investigates the categorical question of 
whether government should support the arts. Such studies, however, are mainly focused on 
the reality of developed countries (King and Blaug 1976; Grampp 1989; Peacock 1994; Frey 
2003; Zimmer and Toepler 1999), which represent the minority of countries in the globe. 
Therefore, this study aims at exploring if the arguments presented by the literature on state 
patronage of arts can apply to emerging economies, herein defined as low and middle-income 
countries with fragile institutions (North 1990; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). The difference in institutions between these countries can 
also be described following North, Wallis and Weingast, as limited-access states and open-
access-states. In the former there is a dominant ruling coalition consisting of the groups who 
possess a potential for organized violence, and they partition economic and political power 
among themselves. Others are excluded and this leads to partial legal arrangements favoring 
the dominant coalition (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009). An open-access state on the other 
hand is marked by competition between various groups in society which puts pressure on the 
state to provide public goods. Economic power and political power are relatively independent 
of one another in such a state.  
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 We will argue in this paper that a central belief in the economic literature on public 
support for the arts does not hold in these countries. This central belief is that in general 
indirect subsidies are preferable over direct subsidies, since they better reflect the preferences 
of the citizens (West 1986; Schuster 1987; 1999; Netzer 2006; Towse 2010). This central belief, 
we will demonstrate, is discredited in two important ways in our case-study of public support 
to the arts in Brazil. Firstly, we show that the state and the private sector are hardly separated 
in this emerging economy, making any clear boundary between the two hard to draw. 
Together big business and the state form a ruling coalition. And therefore most of the relevant 
differences between direct and indirect subsidies disappear. But more importantly given the 
fact that state capacity is limited private parties are actually able to use the indirect subsidy 
arrangement to their private advantage, thereby undoing most if not all of the redistributive 
effects of the policy, and increasing the economic and social power of private actors over the 
cultural sector. We demonstrate that the indirect subsidy policy ends up benefiting the 
supporters, rather than the supposed benefactors.  
Our argument is not merely one about corruption, although that occurs too, but is one 
written along the lines of modern state capacity theory. Our case-study demonstrates that 
when state capacity is weak typical arguments about favoured methods of public support do 
no longer hold (Besley and Persson 2009). Secondly we demonstrate that in the Brazilian case 
it is impossible to disentangle state and private sector from one another, upsetting some of 
the basic assumptions underlying models of public policy for the arts. In particular we 
demonstrate that the biggest art supporters in Brazil – via indirect subsidies – are state-owned 
companies. We argue that in order to understand such investments we cannot rely on a model 
that keeps the state and private sector separate, instead we should analyse them as bargains 
within the ruling elite of the country.  
Our Brazilian case-study is based on original primary data, and highlights some of the 
most important outcomes of the Rouanet1 Law in Brazil. We show using a variety of data 
sources the impacts of this law, and in particular the resulting distribution of funds. The 
Brazilian case elucidates important differences from developed and emerging economies that 
have so far been neglected by the literature of cultural economics. It thus contributes to a 
better understanding of the effects of cultural policies in such settings. As such it can help 
nuance idealized notions of the state and generate more understanding about the challenges 
for cultural policy makers in limited-access orders (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 2003; North 
et al. 2012).           
                                                          
1 Sérgio Paulo Rouanet was the national Secretary of Culture during the period when Law No. 8,313 was 
created. He is also a member of the Brazilian Academy of Letters since 1992. 
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The paper will proceed as follows. The first section develops in some more detail the 
standard theory of the effectiveness of public support for the arts, and the alternative 
perspective provided by entangled political economy. Section two presents the case-study of 
the Rouanet Law and its results. Section three interprets those results using the theory of open 
access-states and state capacity theory. Section four concludes with some implications for 
thinking about cultural policy in emerging and developing countries.     
 
1. Cultural Policy: Direct and Indirect 
 
In the existing literature on state support for the arts there are two primary concerns equity 
and efficiency. To promote efficiency the state is meant to correct certain market failures, 
which typically are said to lead to an underprovision or lack of demand for the arts. 
Prominently in the literature have been concerns about the positive externalities of arts 
production and consumption, and concerns with taste development. Another set of arguments 
in favour of public support have highlighted equity concerns, such as access for low-income 
groups to the arts, as well as regional policies which seek to promote the arts and creative 
sector in particular areas (nowadays often as an economic development strategy) (Frey 2003; 
Ploeg 2006; Throsby 2010).  
 Although most cultural economists agree that there is a viable case for state 
intervention in the arts, it is well recognized that the state faces an information problem when 
it comes to supporting the cultural sector. The major worry is to ensure the right type of 
projects or organizations receive support. One prominent suggestion to overcome this 
problem is to argue against overreliance on supply-side subsidies to producers of arts, and 
instead to favour voucher-schemes. There is relatively widespread agreement that this would 
lead to a more demand-responsive arts sector, although adoption of this type of support has 
been far less widespread.  
Similar reasoning has been used to suggest that it would be preferable to provide tax 
incentives for charitable giving to cultural organizations (indirect support), rather than to 
provide the support from tax revenues (direct support). This would have the dual benefit that 
it would reveal the preferences for support to particular cultural organizations, and it would 
make the cultural organizations more responsive to the wishes of various groups in society 
including donors and the public. Although some have expressed worries that this might limit 
the autonomy of the relevant organizations (Frey 2003). Finally it has been suggested that 




The arguments for indirect support over direct support, has perhaps not been quite as 
widespread as that for demand-side subsidies, but there is still a strong case made by 
economists of the arts in favour of indirect support (Schuster 1999). Again, practice has not 
reflected this belief, and except in Anglo-Saxon countries most government policy for the arts 
still takes place through direct support. Notwithstanding this fact, there have been a variety of 
attempts to place cultural-policy at arm’s length of the government to prevent all too easy 
government-capture. The resulting specialized committees should prevent too much direct 
influence of the state over the cultural sector, and at least nuance the extent to which there 
really is ‘direct support’. Both direct and indirect support tend to go to non-profit 
organizations, which might undercut the overall responsiveness of these organizations to 
consumer demand.  
Public choice approaches have made relatively few inroads in the cultural sector. 
Although some attempts were made during the 1990’s they appear to never have become 
prominent (for an overview see Mazza 2003). This despite the obvious danger that big cultural 
organizations collude with the government, and the fact that big cultural events such as 
festivals might provide politicians with temptations similar to those of big infrastructure 
projects: they make ‘achievements’ highly visible. If there is any political-economic approach it 
has tended to be critical of a recent ‘neo-liberal’ turn in cultural policies, but those issues do 
not concern us here (Belfiore 2004). 
We instead suggest that a modern state capacity theory does far more justice to the 
institutional complexities of cultural policy. State capacity theory argues that effective policy-
making requires sufficient state capacity, which would lead to an open-access order. A lack of 
state-capacity can result from international factors, but is more often theorized as resulting 
from domestic conflicts between elites. A situation of low state capacity and the accompanying 
limited-access order is a political equilibrium “in which elites restrain from violence as long as 
expected rents in the current political arrangement are greater than the expected value of 
fighting” (Fargias 2018: 341). This theory is explicitly developed in relation to economic 
development, a feature lacking from traditional public choice approaches. 
This leads to a recognition of the variety of institutional settings under which cultural 
policy is made, and how such institutional settings influence the expected outcomes. We will 
demonstrate in our case-study that in emerging economies where state and private sector are 
far from separated but instead often form a dominant coalition traditional expectations (based 
on Western experiences with cultural policies) do not hold. Cultural policy in Brazil is not 
widely studied, let alone critically analysed. The recent report on Brazil’s creative economy 
from the British Arts Council pays little attention to governance structure, although two issues 
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we explore below are at least flagged: the entanglement between business and state, as well 
as the great disparities in the economy (Fleming 2018). But the report is also typical as thinking 
of political issues as being outside of the realm of cultural policy, or acting upon it as a kind of 
external constraint (see also Marsh 2016).   
 
2. Case study: state patronage of arts in Brazil 
This section turns to a closer look at the state patronage of arts in Brazil. Our case-study is 
limited to one country, but we hope to illuminate broader political economic issues regarding 
cultural policy at stake in other emerging economies as well as to a lesser extent those in 
advanced economies. For our data we have relied on secondary sources where available and 
some primary sources where relevant. Such analysis will be made based mainly on official data 
from the Brazilian Ministry of Culture (MinC), Brazilian Population Census (IBGE), the World 
Bank and Unesco Institute for Statistics on public education and levels of income, as well as on 
the corruption perceptions index (CPI). 
2.1. Brazilian policies for arts support: the Rouanet Law 
This study will be based on the analysis of the Rouanet Law, which establishes a tax-based 
incentive to the supply side of the Brazilian arts market. Although there are other laws (in the 
federal, state and municipal level) to develop the cultural sector in Brazil, the Rouanet Law is 
the most important one in terms of volume of resources invested in the cultural sector 
(Arminda do Nascimento Arruda 2003). 
According to the official data provided by the Ministry of Culture at the website of Salic 
(Sistema de Apoio às Leis de Incentivo à Cultura), from 1993 to 2016 more than R$ 18 billion 
(approximately USD 5.75 billion) have been invested in culture by means of Rouanet Law. 
During the period, almost 200,000 projects have been proposed, out of which 55% have been 
approved by the governmental bodies and 25% have been actually supported by sponsors and 
donors via Rouanet Law. Graph 1 below illustrates the evolution of projects proposed, 
approved and supported from 1993 to 2016. 
 
Insert Graph 1 here.  
 
The most important mechanism created by the Rouanet Law was the “incentive to cultural 
projects”, also called as tax incentive, which is a mechanism by means of which the federal 
government allows individuals and legal entities to use portions of the income tax (up to 6% or 
4%, respectively) as donations (i.e. anonymous contribution) or sponsorships (i.e. contribution 
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with publicity for the supporter) to directly support cultural projects. The value of the donation 
or sponsorship can be partially or fully deducted from the due income tax (depending on the 
invested cultural sector, the nature of the support – donations or sponsorships – and/or the 
category of the supporter taxpayer – i.e. individuals or legal entities).  
Section 18, § 3º of the Rouanet Law lists the art categories that entitle the deduction of 
the full amount invested by the taxpayers in approved cultural projects, regardless of the 
nature of the support or the category of the supporter taxpayer. All other art forms not 
explicitly mentioned in the provision referred above entitle only a partial deduction from 
income tax. The amount of partial deduction varies as follows: up to (i) 80% for donations 
made by individuals, (ii) 60% for sponsorships carried out by individuals, (iii) 40% for donations 
made by legal entities and (iv) 30% for sponsorships carried out by legal entities. Table 1 
summarizes the thresholds of the tax incentives: 
 
Insert Table 1 here. 
 
The possibility of full deduction of the amount of taxes paid is internationally unusual 
and frequently criticized, typically such arrangements allow one to deduct the donated sum 
from one’s taxable income or profits, not from the actual taxes due. It entails the possibility of 
not paying part of one’s taxes, while enjoying the benefit of deciding on the allocation of 
public money (Belem and Donadone 2013).     
In order for projects to be eligible under the Rouanet law they have to be approved. The 
application process is initiated by the artist, producer or cultural agent. The project is 
subsequently evaluated by several governmental bodies which will approve or reject the 
projects. In case of approval of the project, the applicants are responsible for finding eligible 
supporters.   
In 2010 a bill has been proposed to repeal the Rouanet Law and to establish new rules 
for culture and arts funding. The approval of the referred bill – PL 6,722/2010 – is still pending 
and subject to amendments or rejection. The primary change under the new bill would be the 
abolishment of full tax deduction provided by section 18 (only partial deductions would apply) 
and the empowerment of the government, which would have a more significant role in the 
allocation of the funds. But since the bill is still pending approval, the analysis of the proposed 
new rules will not be part of this work.     
 
2.2. The (Cultural) Economy of Brazil 
According to the IMF database, Brazil has the 9th highest GDP in the world, and is the biggest 
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economy of Latin America. Nonetheless, in terms of GDP per capita Brazil was almost 20% 
below the global average in 2018. The country is plagued by high levels of corruption as has 
been very evident with high politicians being caught up in scandals, as well as high social and 
economic inequality. The 20% of the people with the highest income earned 56.3% of the total 
income. The economic inequality is also reflected geographically. According to IBGE, in 2016 
the difference between the amount of average income per capita between the richest and 
poorest federal units was greater than 400%. The North and Northeast areas of the country 
are the poorest ones, while the highest level of incomes are mostly concentrated in the South 
and Southwest areas, particularly in the big cities. This pattern is also present in terms of 
education. According to the database of Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil, 
produced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in cooperation with some 
Brazilian entities, illiteracy is concentrated in the North and Northeast areas of the country.   
According to the World Bank, despite the poverty reduction over the last decade, there 
is still a high level of inequality in Brazil. The country managed to achieve universal coverage in 
primary education, but is struggling to improve the outcomes of the lower and upper 
secondary levels of education. The concentration of income and precariousness of education 
are reflected in the consumption of artistic-cultural goods and services in Brazil. There is clear 
evidence that the consumption of arts and culture in Brazil is “unequally distributed among the 
population, being determined mainly by education and income” (Diniz and Machado 2011, 17). 
This is also the conclusion of the report released by IBGE in 2013 on the information and 
indicators of culture. According to the research, the poorer the Brazilian family, the lower its 
expenditures with culture. Families with an income greater than R$ 6,225.00 spend 
approximately 17 times more in culture than families with an income up to R$ 830.00 
(Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 2013, 216). Likewise, families whose head of the 
householder has university level education spends on average six times the amount spent by 
families whose householder has no education or incomplete elementary school level.  
There is also widespread (perceived corruption). In 2017 Brazil scored 37 points on to 
the corruption perceptions index, on a scale of 0 to 100 where 0 represents the highest level of 
corruption. This is in line with other South-American countries, and places Brazil at place 96 in 
the world out of 180. According to a survey called “Interesse Público e Corrupção” conducted 
in the years of 2008 and 2009 by a centre of research of the federal university of the state of 
Minas Gerais in cooperation with Instituto Vox Populi, a Brazilian company specialized in 
survey researches, 73% of the Brazilian citizens considered corruption as a very serious issue in 
the country, whereas 24% consider it serious. Given the recent scandals at the highest levels of 
Brazilian politics it is likely that these figures have only risen since. 
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This is unlikely to change in the short-run. The literature argues that corruption in Brazil 
can be explained by its historical origins, particularly by the Portuguese colonialism (Faoro 
2013; Mello 2008). According to Faoro (2013), during the colonization Brazil has inherited the 
Portuguese patrimonialism, which was characterized by three main aspects: the lack of 
separation between the public and private spheres, the detachment of public agents from 
society, and state-directed capitalism. According to Baquero (2015, 147): “the history of 
Brazilian political culture marked by patrimonialism and individualism obstructed the 
differentiation between public and private spheres, facilitating corruption practices within and 
without public institutions”. This is not to say that we believe current policy outcomes are 
mostly historically determined, rather that such patterns have existed for a long period of time 
as suggested by the theory of state capacity, which suggests breaking the equilibrium of weak-
state capacity is difficult.  
 
2.3. Empirical analysis of Rouanet Law 
The evaluation of policy is typically a contested effort, what should count as success. In this 
case-study we have opted to stick to some objective measures, rather than an evaluation of 
the stated goals of the policy. We believe that the results will demonstrate that it is hard to 
contest the failure of the policy, under most feasible sets of goals. The empirical analysis of 
Rouanet Law is structured in six parts, each of them analyzing the following: (i) which are the 
main sources of Rouanet Law funds, (ii) what motivates supporters to invest in cultural 
projects, (iii) where the subsidies go in terms of geographical distribution, (iv) artistic genres 
which benefit the most from Rouanet Law, (v) corruption issues in connection with the 
subsidies granted via Rouanet Law, and (vi) the main changes to the Rouanet Law introduced 
by a normative instruction created by the Ministry of Culture.  
 
2.3.1. Where does the money come from? 
The investments in cultural projects via Rouanet Law can be supported by (i) individuals or (ii) 
by companies that pay income taxes based on their actual net income (i.e. Lucro Real)2. In 
Brazil, there are different tax regimes to calculate the due income tax of legal entities and they 
vary mainly based on the value of gross revenue. The calculation of income tax based on the 
Lucro Real method is mandatory for companies whose total gross revenues exceed R$78 
million per year (around USD 25 million). Consequently, most companies whose total gross 
revenues is lower than R$78 million are not entitled to the tax deductions provided by 
                                                          
2 There is a proposal in place to extend benefits of Rouanet Law to companies taxed under other regimes.   
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Rouanet Law. As a result, Rouanet Law creates an advantage that primarily applies to large 
companies. According to Augustin (2016, 13), in 2009 only thirty companies were responsible 
for half of the total amount invested via Rouanet Law. Such companies were mainly from the 
most concentrated sectors, such as the finance, steel and energy, which also happen to be the 
industries with heavy state involvement. 
Another study estimated the average revenues of the supporting companies in 2005. To do so, 
the total amount of investments via Rouanet Law in 2005 (i.e. R$677 million) was divided by 
the total number of supporting companies (i.e. 1,956). The result (i.e. R$ 346,000.00) indicated 
the average amount invested per supporter. The scholar considered that companies can 
deduct up to 4% of the due tax income, so that he was able to estimate the average amount of 
due income tax per company (i.e. R$ 8.65 million). Considering that the due income tax 
corresponded to 15% of the total profit, the total net profit would correspond to R$ 57 million. 
The author considered a mark-up of 20% over the revenues, which indicated a total revenue of 
R$ 288 million (Cavalcanti 2006).      
It is worth noting that such a calculation is simplified and presents some limitations. First, it 
ignores the fact that the total amount of investments via Rouanet Law comprises not only the 
support from legal entities, but also the amounts invested by individuals. But since individual 
donations make up less than 1% of the amount invested they might be ignored. Second, the 
amount of tax deduction may vary, it is not necessarily a full deduction. But adjusting for this 
would only mean we would arrive at higher estimates. Third, there is no explanation to justify 
why the mark-up over revenue was set as 20%. Despite the limitations mentioned above, the 
literature has presented no alternative methodology to estimate the revenues of supporter 
companies in a more accurate way.  
Therefore, if we replicate the methodology in this study for the last five years (i.e. 2012 
to 2016), with the adjustment to consider only the support provided by legal entities, the 
results indicate an average revenue above R$ 300 million, as detailed in the table 2. 
 
Insert table 2 here. 
  
It is worth highlighting that according to Brazilian Law 11,638/07, companies with a gross 
revenue higher than R$ 300 million are classified as large-sized companies. In this sense, it 
would be possible to conclude that most of the funds raised by Rouanet Law come from large-
sized companies. Additionally, the Rouanet Law primarily benefits highly profitable 
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corporations. Since tax incentives are only applicable to profitable companies (if there is no 
profit, there is no due tax income), and considering that the incentive is calculated as a 
percentage of the income tax, the higher the profits, the higher the tax incentive. Therefore, 
the tax incentive generated by Rouanet Law, subsidizes not only cultural projects, but also the 
cultural marketing of major for-profit corporations, as explained in more detail in section 2.3.2.         
Another important finding regarding the major supporters under the Rouanet regime is the 
strong presence of state-controlled companies and quasi-governmental companies as the main 
supporters of the projects. According to a report prepared by SEBRAE (Serviço Brasileiro de 
Apoio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas), an institution supporting the development of small and 
micro companies in Brazil, 2,462 projects (more than 80% of the projects in table 3) were 
supported by companies having at least a minority shareholding held directly or indirectly by a 
governmental or governmental-related entity  (companies ranked as 1-5 and 8-9) and 2,213 
projects (more than 73% of the projects listed in table 3) were supported by state-controlled 
companies (companies ranked as 1-4 and 8-9). This situation reflects the entangled 
relationship between politics and markets, which act as “overlapping subsystems of human 
interaction within a society” (Tuszynski and Wagner 2015, 106). For instance, an analysis of the 
Bovespa Index (Ibovespa), composed by the more actively traded and better representative 
stocks of the Brazilian stock market, shows that most of the participation in the Ibovespa (i.e. 
52.6%) is held by companies that have at least a minority shareholding held directly or 
indirectly by a governmental or governmental-related entity.  
Insert Table 3 here 
 
2.3.2. What are the motivations to support cultural projects? 
 
It might be argued that despite the strong concentration of donations/sponsorships among 
(partly) state-owned large corporations, the investments could still be given by those with an 
interest and motivation to support the arts. A research conducted by Fundação João Pinheiro, 
under the request of the Ministry of Culture, has revealed, however, that this is also not the 
case (Fundação João Pinheiro 1998). Based on a survey applied to a sample of 111 companies 
their main motivations to support cultural projects they conclude that companies are mainly 
motivated by publicity strategies, rather than social purposes. The main motivation for 
companies to invest in cultural projects was the promotion of institutional image. Such 
motivation has been mentioned by more than 65% of the companies, while less than 24% 
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mentioned the reinforcement of the company´s social rule as a reason for the support 
(multiple answers were possible). Table 4 presents more details on the matter.  
 
Insert Table 4 here 
In this sense, Barbalho (2007) explains that a common critique from the artists and cultural 
producers to the Rouanet Law is that companies are only interested in projects that have 
media visibility and audience appeal. Therefore, projects in areas that traditionally get less 
exposure to the media and large audiences struggle to raise funds through the Rouanet Law. 
As we will see below, this results in investments ending up highly concentrated among already 
popular artists and institutions. This view is corroborated by Ponte (2012, 35) who argues that 
the fact that the decisions on public investment in arts and culture are taken by the marketing 
departments of large companies can directly interfere in the artistic purpose or in the format 
of the cultural project.  
 According to Mega (2015, 57), the sponsorship guidelines of some supporters – 
including private and state-owned companies – such as Santander, Eletrobras, Natura, Correios 
and Volkswagen explicitly impose restrictions to the freedom of artistic expression and 
creativity by means of prohibiting cultural projects that are connected with polemic issues 
such as violence, drugs, weapons and pornography. Such preferences of supporters are of 
course legitimate and are to be expected in any indirect support system, but if investments are 
so concentrated it might still be considered problematic. 
   
2.3.3. Where does the money go? 
In this section we are again relying on the official information collected by Salic, for the 
amount of tax expenditures invested in culture by means of the Rouanet Law during the five 
year period from 2012 - 2016. The analyzed data indicates a substantial geographical disparity 
on the amount of funds invested by means of the Rouanet Law. As graph 2 shows there is a 
huge concentration of investments in the Southeast area of the country, while the Northeast 
and North receive much more modest sums. 
 
Insert Graph 2 here. 
 
The data also indicates that there is an enormous concentration of resources in the richest 
federal units. The five richest federal units (out of 27) in terms of average income per capita 
(i.e. Distrito Federal, São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Rio de Janeiro) account 
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for approximately 84% of all Rouanet Law funds invested in 2016. On the other hand, the five 
poorest federal units (i.e. Maranhão, Alagoas, Pará, Amazonas and Piauí) account for less than 
1.5% of such funds. 
Such disparities cannot be explained by means of concentration of population. The 
disparity in the allocation of subsidies is much higher than the discrepancies in population 
density (projected by IBGE). For instance, the state of São Paulo, the most populous one, is 
home to around 21% of the total population of the country and received in 2016 almost 50% 
of all the resources obtained via Rouanet Law. Likewise, the state of Rio de Janeiro is home to 
around 8% of the population and received in 2016 more than 20% of the subsidies from 
Rouanet Law. Graph 3 illustrates the levels of population and concentration of Rouanet Law 
funds in each of the five Brazilian federal units most benefited by Rouanet Law in 2016. 
 
Insert graph 3 here. 
 
The geographical inequality is also evident when comparing the per capita distribution of funds 
from the Rouanet Law in each federal unit. Alagoas, in the North region of the country, is the 
federal unit that received the lowest amounts of Rouanet Law subsidies per capita in 2016, a 
total of only R$ 0.01 per inhabitant. On the other hand, the highest amount of subsidies per 
capita was received by Distrito Federal, the capital of the country, and corresponds to R$ 
21.07. That amount is nearly four times the national average and 2,107 times the per capita 
amount received by Alagoas.   
When comparing the regions, the Southeast received in 2016 R$ 9.80 of subsidies per 
inhabitant, while the Northeast area received only R$ 0.57 of subsidies per inhabitant, 
corresponding to around 181.8% and 10.6% of the national average, respectively. Table 5 
presents the amounts of subsidies per capita for each federal unit and per region. 




2.3.4. Which art forms benefit from the Rouanet Law? 
 
In addition to the regional concentration of subsidies, the funds from the Rouanet Law are also 
heavily concentrated in terms of artistic genres. The supported projects are classified into 
seven categories. Graph 4 demonstrates from 2012 to 2016 the subsidies have been mostly 
concentrated in performing arts (33%), followed by music (23) and visual arts (16%).  
Insert graph 4 here. 
The concentration of funds in certain genres may be partially explained by the fact that they go 
to the most costly genres in terms of production costs. Nonetheless, there are three other 
reasons that may also help to explain such allocation of funds: (i) cultural marketing strategies, 
(ii) levels of tax deduction, and (iii) complexity of the application process.  
First, supporters decide which project to support based on their marketing strategies. As 
explained by Mega (Mega 2015, 4), supporter companies tend to invest in large shows that 
proportionate high levels of media exposure and attendance. Such kind of events are more 
likely to happen in the performing arts (e.g. adaptations of Broadway plays), music (e.g. music 
festivals with superstars) and visual arts sectors (e.g. exhibitions of prestigious artists). Often 
these projects are already profitable without the donation. In 2011 approximately R$45 million 
of the funds raised by Rouanet Law have been invested in large Broadway productions. This 
amount corresponds to more than 15% of the Rouanet Law subsidies directed to performing 
arts in 2011. According to the author, these blockbuster events garner high levels of publicity 
to the supporter companies, and consequently contribute to add value to their brands.   
Second, supporters tend to prefer to invest in sectors that entitle full deduction of the 
investment (sectors listed in section 18 of Rouanet Law). This could explain why investments in 
performing arts are higher than in music, since all investments in performing arts allow full 
deduction, while only investments in instrumental and classical music are fully deductible.     
Third, the concentration of investments in certain genres may also indicate that the 
bureaucracy for proposing projects is likely to deter the less privileged artists and producers – 
from less appealing segments such as integrated arts – from seeking for subsidies, since they 
do not have trained people to help them with the application process. The high levels of 
bureaucracy and the complexity of the application process have been acknowledged by the 
Ministry of Culture, which has formally proposed adjustments to the Rouanet Law to reduce 
the bureaucracy and to prohibit the use of intermediaries in the application process (as per 
section 37 of the PL 6,722). As explained by Barbalho (2007), artists are increasingly required 
to get professionalized by means of hiring a team of support professionals, such as producers, 
14 
 
fundraisers, researches and marketing professionals, which consequently tends to exclude the 
artists who are not already established. 
 
2.3.5. Corruption in connection with Rouanet Law  
 
According to the regional chief of the Office of the Comptroller General in the state of São 
Paulo 87% of the projects financed by the Rouanet Law contain serious failures to comply with 
the rules in the law. This conclusion comes from the analysis of a sample of 34,000 cultural 
projects from 1992 to 2015. The Communication Department of the Attorney General’s Office 
in the State of São Paulo, on June 28, 2016 has announced an operation aimed to investigate 
the (potential) abuse of federal funds, called Operation Freeload. They estimated that 
fraudulent behavior was present in many cases and caused a loss of approximately R$180 
million to public purse (around USD 57 million). The Federal Police believe that the 
irregularities may include, among other aspects, the return of part of the donated funds to 
supporter companies. According to the Ministry of Culture, there are approximately 18,000 
projects whose accountability assessment is still pending. 
Moreover, the Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) has investigated alleged 
irregularities in the financial support approved by the Ministry of Culture based on Rouanet 
Law to some cultural projects, such as Rock in Rio, a major musical festival. As a result of the 
investigations, TCU recommended the Ministry of Culture not to authorize the raising of funds 
to projects that present a strong potential to be profitable or have the capacity to attract 
sufficient private investments. According to the TCU’s decision, the practice of charging prices 
that cannot be considered accessible to society in general conflicts with the purposes of the 
Brazilian Federal Constitution and the Rouanet Law, which aims at assuring access for all 
citizens to cultural events and access to the sources of national culture (as per section 215 of 
the Brazilian Federal Constitution and section 1st of Rouanet Law). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that corruption is also present within some important 
supporters. For instance, Petrobras, the Brazilian state-oil company which supported the 
largest number of projects within the period from 2008 to 2013, wrote-off an amount of R$ 6.2 
billion (at the time approximately USD 2 billion) due to alleged bribery payments in 2014. 
Likewise, BNDES, which was also among the largest supporters of cultural projects via Rouanet 
Law in the referred period, is being investigated by the Federal Police under the investigation 
called Operação Bullish, initiated in May, 2017. The investigation aims at clarifying alleged 
frauds and irregularities within the granting of funds by BNDES to JBS, a company controlled by 
J&F, who entered into a leniency agreement with Federal Public Prosecutor's Office after 
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confessing the involvement in a corruption scheme. It is worth mentioning that BNDES 
indirectly owns more than 21% of JBS’s shares, which also emphasizes the entangled 
relationship between the public and private sphere.  
 
2.3.6. Suggested Reforms 
In response to the regional disparities and high prices of cultural products and services funded 
by means of the Rouanet Law, the Ministry of Culture released on December 26, 2017 the 
Normative Instruction 5/2017 (IN 5/2017) aiming at assuring the fundaments of the law: 
fomenting national culture in a decentralized way, democratizing the access to the resources 
from the tax incentives and to the cultural goods supported by Rouanet Law. The new rules try 
to induce the increase of projects mainly in the North, Northeast and Midwest regions, but 
also in the South and part of Southeast regions by means of increasing the thresholds of 
number of projects per proponent and resources per proponent for projects carried out in 
such areas (“Thresholds”).  
Therefore, the IN 5/2017 states that the referred thresholds can be increased up to (i) 
50% in the North, Northeast and Midwest regions and (ii) 25% in the South region and in two 
states of the Southeast region (i.e. Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo). The first possible problem 
of such measures is that the Midwest area includes Distrito Federal, which is the richest 
federal unit of the country in terms of average income per capita, and the federal unit that 
received the highest amounts of Rouanet Law subsidies per inhabitant in 2016. In addition, 
analyzing the numbers of the last five years (i.e. 2012 - 2016), Distrito Federal has been always 
one of the five federal units most benefited by the Rouanet Law in absolute values, as detailed 
in the table 5. 
 
Insert Table 5 here. 
 
In this sense, supporters may opt to invest in Distrito Federal to benefit from the higher 
thresholds, rather than investing in less privileged areas. If that happens, the decentralization 
pursued by the law will be unlike to happen. The same holds for Minas Gerais, which has also 
been among the five states which most benefited by the Rouanet Law in the past 5 years. 
Another weakness of the IN 5/2017 relates to the thresholds themselves. Article 4 of the 
IN 5/2017 states that the proponents (legal entities) shall not have more than sixteen projects 
supported by the Rouanet Law and that they shall not receive more than R$60 million (except 
in some specific cases, such as annual or biennial plans, where the monetary thresholds do not 
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apply). To make matters worse there is a condition that within a long-term plan the total sum 
can still be used in one single project. Our data indicates that such thresholds do not seem 
actually restrictive to the proponents. For instance, seven out of the ten largest proponents 
invested the funds in annual and biennial plans, which are not subject to the limitations. 
Additionally, none of the ten largest proponents in 2016 reached the limits of R$60 million or 
the sixteen projects threshold. Table 6 provides more details. 
 
Insert Table 6 here.     
 
It is therefore unlikely that the changes introduced by IN 5/2017 are sufficient to promote the 
decentralization of investments made under the Rouanet Law. This is especially true in light of 
the fact that the Rouanet Law has become an important instrument of cultural marketing for 
the sponsoring companies (Calabre 2007).  
Another concern addressed by the IN 5/2017 relates to the price of the cultural services 
and goods subsidized by the Rouanet law. The rules establish that (i) at least 10% of the tickets 
shall be distributed free of charge to the population, (ii) up to 10% can be distributed free of 
charge to the sponsors, (iii) up to 10% can be distributed free of charge to advertising 
purposes, (iv) at least 20% shall be commercialized for no more than R$ 75 (corresponding to 
7.5% of the current monthly minimum wage or approximately 7% of the Brazilian average 
income per capita in 2016) and (v) up to 50% can be commercialized for an average price equal 
or lower than R$ 225 (corresponding to 24% of the current monthly minimum wage or of 
approximately 21% of the Brazilian average income per capita in 2016).    
The careful analysis of such numbers also seems to stress the weakness of IN 5/2017 to 
promote democratization of access. According to the data from Eurostat (2010), private 
consumption expenditure on culture-related goods and services in Europe as a share of total 
household expenditure averages 3.6%, with just few countries exceeding 5% (i.e. Denmark, 
Sweden and United Kingdom). In Brazil, according to Diniz & Machado (2011), the 
expenditures on cultural-artistic goods and services account for less than 1.5% of the total 
household expenditure. In this sense, the maximum prices established by the IN 5/2017 for the 
cultural tickets and goods are still very high and unlikely to actually democratize the access to 
culture. 
 
2.4. State patronage of arts and the crowding-out effect 
Crowding-out is typically considered to be the effect of increased state support on the level of 
private support. But in our case we must think of it as the influence of the Rouanet Law on 
17 
 
private support outside of the framework of the Rouanet Law. These effects have been studied 
by Earp and Estrella (Earp and Estrella 2016). Their results demonstrate that in 1996 the real 
value of the amounts raised for arts and culture by means of tax deductions totalled around 
R$133 million, in 2014 this amount increased to approximately R$1,260 million. The private 
investments, on the other hand, amounted R$230 million in 1996 and decreased to R$74 
million in 2014. The crowding-out effect is illustrated by in graph 5.  
 
Insert graph 5 here. 
 
Graph 6 compares the real value of the investments made by means of private capital and tax 
deductions from 1996 to 2014: 
 
Insert Graph 6 here.  
 
The main reason for the dramatic decrease of private support is the amendment of Rouanet 
Law in the second semester of 1997 by means of the Medida Provisória 1,589/97 (Belem and 
Donadone 2013, 56). The new rule introduced the possibility of deducting 100% of the 
sponsorship or donation for cultural projects in certain sectors (i.e. the ones listed by section 




The data strongly suggests that the Rouanet Law fails to achieve any of the stated or 
reasonably accepted aims of a policy aimed to support the arts. The policy does not stimulate 
more experimental forms of arts, does not increase access to the arts for lower income groups, 
does not lead to regional redistribution of funds, and it is not clear from the evidence that any 
particular market failure is alleviated through the support. Instead it seems that the system of 
indirect support leads to a strong control over the cultural sector by some of the major 
companies in Brazil. These big companies are frequently state-owned or quasi-governmental 
companies. As such it is a question whether we really should be speaking of a system of 
indirect support, since it appears that different parts of the government than the ministry of 
culture is in control of the funds that go to the cultural sector. 
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 The money ends up with a relatively small number, often already profitable, 
organizations in the form of sponsorships rather than donations. Geographically the money is 
highly concentrated in the most developed areas and in particular cities within the country. 
Similar to other parts of the economy, here too there are significant signs of serious 
corruption, including the funnelling back of sponsorship money to the ‘donating’ companies. 
Attempts at reform have been unsuccessful or inconsequential. And private support outside of 
the framework of the Rouanet law has nearly dried up, while the overall level of support has 
not increased much.  
 So while a system of indirect support has been implemented, this has not lead to the 
supposed benefits of such a system. Rather it has given the business sector nearly complete 
control over cultural policy in Brazil. This business sector, at least the biggest businesses (and 
supporters of the arts) are mostly state-owned enterprises. So it is even unclear whether we 
should really speak of indirect support here.  
This problem of the entanglement of the public and private sector is left unaddressed 
in current discussions about support to the arts. From the standard cultural policy perspective 
it might be argued that Brazil is suffering from high levels of corruption which prevent effective 
cultural policy. But we think that the data actually shows that this is not merely corruption, 
although that occurs as well, but rather the effects of bargains with the ruling coalition. From 
the perspective of state capacity theory, we should consequently analyse the situation as one 
which is the outcome of such bargains and which seek to secure the economic and political 
base of this coalition. The case-study also shows that the cultural sector is believed to be 
important enough to be controlled by this ruling coalition, so as to neutralize its potentially 
disruptive effects. 
It is clear that the state-owned and quasi-governmental enterprises have been treated 
very favourably by the Rouanet Law, which allows them to invest parts of their due taxes to 
the cultural sector. This means in fact that in the current situation that the state-owned and 
quasi-governmental enterprises are currently in control of arts policies in Brazil, and it is 
unlikely that they are willing to give this up without extensive compensation.  
 Future attempts to improve arts policies in Brazil should therefore not merely seek to 
overcome particular forms of corruption, but the ministry of culture should first aim to retake 
control over cultural policy. This is unlikely to be an easy trajectory (North et al. 2012). What 
has in fact happened is that powerful corporations are using their economic power to obtain 
other types of power in Brazilian society. For the period we have analysed this is particularly 
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strong, but it should be noted that any type of indirect support system has this inherent 
danger. In the United States for example the Rockefeller and in particular the Ford Foundation 
have for a long-time been the major benefactors to the arts (Kreidler 1996). It seems therefore 
that there are good reasons to re-evaluate the general preference for systems of indirect 
support in the arts.  
 This might be more generally true in emerging economies in which there often is no 
extensive policy tradition in fields such as the arts, which in most Western countries is only a 
post-WWII phenomenon. When such a policy tradition is absent it might be more important to 
first establish one through direct support with a clear agenda. That is, of course, if one believes 




Our case-study of the Rouanet Law in Brazil has highlighted its particular effects through the 
examination of the origins of funds, the benefactors and the extent to which funds are used 
appropriately. We have demonstrated that existing inequalities are reinforced by the Rouanet 
Law, that funds mostly come from state-owned or quasi-governmental enterprises which use 
the support for branding and marketing, and that corruption is a frequent occurrence. We 
have also demonstrated that neither social goals (more access) nor regional goals (spreading of 
arts) are achieved. 
These results demonstrate, we believe, that many of the basic notions that underlie the 
standard framework of analysis of cultural policies with the economics of the arts break down 
in different institutional settings. In our case-study we demonstrated that there was no clear 
distinction between the public and the private sector, but rather both were governed by a 
dominant coalition. We have argued that changes in cultural policy itself will unlikely be 
effective if Brazil retains characteristics of a limited access order. In such a situation many of 
the standard prescriptions such as a preference for systems of indirect support rather than 
direct state support do not hold, or should at least be seriously bracketed.  
We believe it is of great importance that economists concerned with cultural policy take 
a greater interest in the institutional foundations, and the underlying state capacity on which 
cultural policy is build. This has the potential to markedly improve the understanding and 
analysis of current cultural policies, and might help to improve them in the future. In particular 
this is of relevance since cultural policies, including the development of the creative industries, 
is now often actively promoted as a strategy of economic development. If economic 
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development is the goal, than the challenges of economic development should be far better 
understood in the literature on cultural policy and cultural economics.  
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